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INTRODUCTION: FIDELITY, ECONOMIC LIBERTY, AND 1937*
In 1937 and the years immediately following, the Supreme Court
profoundly and permanently transformed constitutional jurisprudence. In several decisions, the Court demonstrated that it was no
longer willing to interpret the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to prevent governmental regulation of economic
activities. By doing so, the Court switched from its earlier view,
under which it vigorously protected economic liberties from state
interference, and signaled it would uphold the government's
regulation of economic liberties if it passed a relaxed-some would
argue perfunctory-standard of review.
The decisions of 1937 did not signal the death of "substantive due
process" as a doctrine that the Court would use to invalidate police
power regulations. To the contrary, on numerous occasions subsequent to 1937, the Court invalidated legislation that interfered
with noneconomic, personal liberties on notions of "substantive due
process" or its derivative. Indeed, although West Coast Hotel Co. v.
1 memorialized the Court's disenchantment with using the
Parrish
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down legislation interfering with
economic liberties, the Court signaled that it would treat personal
liberties differently just one year later. Writing for the majority in
United States v. Carolene Products Co.,2 Justice Stone confirmed
that "regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless.., it is of
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests on some
rational basis .... "' In the most famous footnote to be found in the
U.S. Reports, Justice Stone laid the foundation for the Court's use
of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate legislation impinging
upon fundamental constitutional values.
Accordingly, since the 1937 transformation, the Court has used
the doctrine of "substantive due process" or its derivative to protect
* This Symposium is the product of a conference held on February 27, 1999, at the
William and Mary School of Law in Williamsburg, Virginia.
1. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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personal liberties, while offering little protection to economic liberties. The central issue raised in this symposium on Fidelity,
Economic Liberty, and 1937 is whether this distinction between
economic liberties and personal liberties-that the Due Process
Clause protects one and not the other-is faithful to the
Constitution.
A comprehensive study of this question gives rise to a host of
concomitant issues. For instance, does the Court's jurisprudence
distinguishing economic from noneconomic liberties allow the
individual Justices to choose arbitrarily which rights are worthy of
protection and which are not? What is meant by "fidelity" to the
Constitution? If fidelity is our guiding principle, through what
interpretive lens should constitutional provisions be viewed? Can
Professor Lessig's translation theory justify the Court's searching
review of the regulations of personal liberties? Does Professor
Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments better explain the
bifurcated treatment of liberties? Is fidelity assured only by examination of the Constitution's text, structure, and history, and if so,
are conventional views of these sources myopic? What are we to
make of so-called Lochner-Erajurisprudence, and what prompted
the transformation of 1937, if indeed there was one?
The Institute of Bill of Rights Law and the William and Mary
Law Review invited several prominent scholars to discuss these and
related issues.4 The works that follow advance the conversation
about fidelity and economic liberty, and call on all sides to defend
their accounts of this intriguing and pivotal jurisprudential
dilemma.
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4. Professor Lawrence Lessig attended the conference and contributed to the
discussion, but was unable to contribute to this Symposium.

